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In a recent paper, Gray, Knickman and Wegner (2011) present three 
experiments which they take to show that people perceive patients in a 
persistent vegetative state (PVS) to have less mentality than the dead. 
Following on from Gomes and Parrott (2014), we provide evidence to 
show that participants’ responses in the initial experiments are an artefact 
of the questions posed. Results from two experiments show that, once the 
questions have been clarified, people do not ascribe more mental capacity 
to the dead than to PVS patients. There is no reason to think that people 
perceive PVS patients as more dead than dead. 
Keywords: Mind perception; Dualism; Persistent Vegetative State (PVS). 
1. Introduction 
A patient in a vegetative state is one who ‘appears at times to be wakeful, 
with cycles of eye closure and eye opening resembling those of sleep and 
waking. However… there is no evidence that the patient can perceive the 
environment or his/her own body, communicate with others, or form 
intentions.’ (Royal College of Physicians 2003, p.1). Someone in such a 
condition, though clearly alive from a biological perspective, exhibits only 
minimal signs of mental functioning. Since the patient is unable to 
communicate in any way, others are frequently asked to determine the 
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course of medical treatment on her behalf.1 In many cases, the choice to 
maintain or terminate medical intervention is disputed. In part this is 
because the precise level of mentality of someone in a persistent vegetative 
state is not well-understood (cf. Owen and Coleman, 2008). This places 
pressure on policy-makers and bioethicists to better understand not only 
the science of the persistent vegetative state, but also public attitudes 
towards persistent vegetative state (Gipson, Kahane and Savulescu 2014). 
How do we view the mental life of such patients? How and when do we 
ascribe mental states or capacities to them? The answers to these questions 
can inform legal and ethical thinking about our responsibilities to PVS 
patients. 
In a recent paper, Gray, Knickman and Wegner (2011) defend the 
following claims: that people perceive patients in a persistent vegetative 
state (PVS) as having less mental capacity than the dead; and that this is 
explained by the presence of implicit afterlife beliefs or implicit dualistic 
thinking. In Gomes and Parrott (2014) we criticised each of these claims. 
We argued, first, that the experimental data do not support the claim that 
people perceive patients in PVS to have less mental capacity than the dead, 
and, second, that even if people perceive patients in PVS to have less 
mental capacity than the dead, there is a better explanation for these 
judgements which doesn’t turn on ascribing to people implicit afterlife 
beliefs or implicit dualistic thinking. 
Our arguments were largely based on theoretical considerations. In this 
paper we experimentally explore the claim that people perceive PVS 
patients as having less mental capacity than the dead. We report the results 
of two independent studies. The first focuses on the presentation of the 
data in Gray et al. (2011). Gray et al. report data that seem to show that 
people ascribe significantly more mentality to the dead than to patients in 
PVS. By slightly varying their experimental design, our first study suggests 
that these results may be partially the result of a confounding variable. 
The experiments in our first study follow Gray et. al. in using participants’ 
responses to fictional vignettes as a way of determining how people think 
 
1 Some recent evidence suggests that at least some vegetative patients (including one PVS 
patient) can answer ‘yes/no’ questions by engaging in certain forms of imaginative activity 
(Monti, et. al. 2010; Fernandez Espejo and Owen 2013). It is not clear yet what to make 
of these results, nor is it straightforward to determine what implications they have for our 
moral obligations to vegetative patients (for discussion see Kahane and Savulescu 2009). 
For the moment, the decision about how to treat PVS patients remains with others. 
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about the mental capacities of PVS patients and the dead. But there are 
complications involved in using people’s responses to fictional texts in this 
way. In particular, it may be that participants’ responses to fictional texts 
are determined as much by the general conventions surrounding the 
reading of a fictional text as by their views on the matter in hand. We 
exploit this possibility in our second study to show that the framing of the 
question affects the responses that people give. Once the questions are 
appropriately clarified, the effect disappears. This indicates that the data in 
Gray et. al. (2011) suggesting that people perceive PVS patients to have 
less mental capacity than the dead is an artefact of the way the original 
questions were posed. 
2. Gray et al. (2011) 
Gray et al. (2011) designed three experiments to test people’s judgements 
about the mental capacities of people in a persistent vegetative state when 
compared both to living people and to the dead. In Experiment 1, 
participants are given one of three different vignettes describing a fictional 
character named David who has been in a car accident and either lives, 
dies, or enters a persistent vegetative state (PVS). Participants are then 
asked to rate David’s mental capacity by indicating on a 7-point scale from 
3 to -3, where 3 indicates ‘strong agreement’ and -3 indicates ‘strong 
disagreement’, whether he ‘can influence the outcomes of situations’, ‘has 
emotions and feelings’, ‘knows right from wrong’, ‘is aware of his 
environment’, ‘has a personality’, and can ‘remember the events of his life’. 
In this experiment, participants reading the PVS vignette gave the lowest 
rating of mental capacity to David (Life: M = 1.77, SD = 1.02; Death: M 
= - 0.29; SD = 1.76; GKW PVS M = -1.73, SD = 1.36, (Gray, et. al., 
2011)). 
In Experiment 2, a corpse vignette was added in order to control for the 
possibility that ‘the dead are conferred more mind because of a reduced 
bodily focus’ (p.277).  In this experiment, participants reading the PVS 
vignette still attributed a lower degree of mental capacity to David than 
those reading the death vignette. However, a notable result of Experiment 
2 is that ‘non-religious participants did not ascribe less mind in the PVS 
condition than in the corpse condition.’ (p.278)   
Experiment 3 differed from the previous two in that participants were 
given vignettes asking them to imagine that they had been in an 
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automobile accident and were either dead or in a PVS. In addition to 
being asked to rate their own mental capacities, participants were also 
asked to rate on a 7-point scale ‘how bad’ the outcome would be for them. 
The PVS outcome was rated to be much worse than death and, as in the 
previous two experiments, also rated to have the least amount of mental 
capacity.   
Based on the results of these studies, Gray et al. conclude that ‘people 
consistently viewed the persistent vegetative state as something less than 
dead: they ascribed less mind to people in a PVS (Experiments 1-3) and 
saw it as worse than death (Experiment 3)’ (p.278). 
3. PVS and Brain-Destruction 
The text which Gray et al. use to test participants’ reactions to a person in 
PVS is as follows: 
David Tuchman grew up in a small city in Ohio.  He went to college in 
Michigan and returned home to Ohio afterwards to work at his family’s 
local business.  Shortly after he moved back home, he went out to 
dinner with some friends from high school at a local restaurant.  On his 
way home from dinner, David’s car was struck head on by a truck that 
swerved across the median.  The ambulance arrived very quickly, but 
there was not much they could do for David.  Although David did not 
die, he entered a Persistent Vegetative State.  David’s entire brain was 
destroyed, except for the one part that keeps him breathing.  So while 
his body is still technically “alive,” he will never wake up again. 
As was pointed out in Gomes and Parrott (2014) this text is misleading in 
a number of ways. First, the text contains explicit information that is 
obviously relevant to the question of whether or not David has any mental 
capacities. Specifically, the vignette tells readers that David’s ‘entire brain 
was destroyed, except for the one part that keeps him breathing’. This 
information alone could determine one’s answer to questions about 
David’s mental capacities, especially if one thinks that functioning brains 
are necessary for sustaining mental capacities. Second, the text uses scare 
quotes to flag the term “alive”. According to standard theories in 
linguistics, quotation marks encompassing a word indicate non-standard 
usage (Gutzmann and Stei 2011; Predelli 2003). Non-standard usage is 
further indicated by the use of the word “technically” (Holmes 1984).  
5 
Gray et al. claim they are testing “lay intuitions” about a subject’s mental 
capacities (p.256). But if we want to test lay intuitions, we should not 
provide a detailed specification of PVS which makes it very unlikely that 
David has any degree of mentality, especially when such a characterisation 
of PVS is highly controversial (Shea and Bayne 2010; Owen and Coleman 
2008). In our first experiment we follow up on the suggestion presented in 
Gomes and Parrott (2014) and test people’s intuitions about PVS by 
providing them with a text which does not provide any further 
information about the nature of PVS.  
4. Study 1 
a. Procedures. 
In this study, we mimic the experiment of Gray et al. (2011) with the 
addition of a condition that does not define PVS as involving almost-total 
brain destruction. Participants were given one of the following four 
vignettes. 
Life condition. David Tuchman grew up in a small city in Ohio.  He 
went to college in Michigan and returned home to Ohio afterwards to 
work at his family’s local business.  Shortly after he moved back home, 
he went out to dinner with some friends from high school at a local 
restaurant.  On his way home from dinner, David’s car was struck head 
on by a truck that swerved across the median.  David suffered from 
major injuries including temporary damage to his brain.  He was in a 
coma for a short time but woke up.  Now, David is fully recovered.  
His brain is fully functioning and he has all of the mental capacities of a 
normal person. 
Death condition. David Tuchman grew up in a small city in Ohio.  He 
went to college in Michigan and returned home to Ohio afterwards to 
work at his family’s local business.  Shortly after he moved back home, 
he went out to dinner with some friends from high school at a local 
restaurant.  On his way home from dinner, David’s car was struck head 
on by a truck that swerved across the median.  When the ambulance 
arrived at the scene, there was nothing they could do to save him.  
David passed away two hours later at the hospital. 
GKW PVS Condition. David Tuchman grew up in a small city in Ohio.  
He went to college in Michigan and returned home to Ohio afterwards 
to work at his family’s local business.  Shortly after he moved back 
home, he went out to dinner with some friends from high school at a 
local restaurant.  On his way home from dinner, David’s car was struck 
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head on by a truck that swerved across the median.  The ambulance 
arrived very quickly, but there was not much they could do for David.  
Although David did not die, he entered a Persistent Vegetative State.  
David’s entire brain was destroyed, except for the one part that keeps 
him breathing.  So while his body is still technically “alive,” he will 
never wake up again. 
New PVS condition. David Tuchman grew up in a small city in Ohio.  
He went to college in Michigan and returned home to Ohio afterwards 
to work at his family’s local business.  Shortly after he moved back 
home, he went out to dinner with some friends from high school at a 
local restaurant.  On his way home from dinner, David’s car was struck 
head on by a truck that swerved across the median.  The ambulance 
arrived very quickly, but there was not much they could do for David.  
Although David did not die, due to head trauma he entered a Persistent 
Vegetative State.  So while David is still breathing, he will never wake 
up again. 
Participants then rated their agreement with the following series of 
statements, as used in Gray et al. (2011). Ratings were offered on a scale 
from -3 to 3, with -3 representing ‘strongly disagree,’ 3 ‘strongly agree,’ 
and 0 ‘neither agree nor disagree.’ 
[Aware] David is aware of his environment. 
[Influence] David can influence the outcomes of situations. 
[Emotion] David has emotions and feelings. 
[RightWrong] David knows right from wrong. 
[Personality] David has a personality. 
[Memory] David can remember the events of his life. 
 
Gray et al. (2011) did not measure the religiosity of the participants in 
their first study. We therefore adopted the methods they used in their 
second study to measure the religiosity of participants, asking participants 
to rate their agreement to the following three statements on a scale from -3 
to 3, with -3 representing ‘strongly disagree,’ 3 ‘strongly agree,’ and 0 
‘neither agree nor disagree.’ 
There is life after death. 
The soul lives on after a person has died. 
I am a religious person. 
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Participants were 205 adults recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk. 19 participants failed a comprehension question, or failed to fill out 
the entire survey, and were excluded from analysis. Of the remaining 186 
participants, 78 were female (mean age=33.60). 
b. Results. 
Following Gray et al. (2011), we averaged responses for each participant to 
form a mind perception index (Cronbach’s α=.929). We then conducted a 
4 (State: life, GKW PVS, New PVS, Death) x 2 (Sex: female, male) 
analysis of variance (ANOVA). This test revealed a main effect of state 
(F(3, 185) = 58.11, p>.001), but none for Sex, F (1, 185) = 2.41, p=.122, 
and no interaction, F(3, 185) = .231, p=.875. Fischer’s least significant 
difference tests (LSD) revealed that each condition significantly differed 
from the others (for each comparison except that between Death and New 
PVS, ps<.001; concerning the difference between Death and New PVS, 
p=.018). Mean mind perception index ratings for the four conditions were 
as follows: Life (M=2.08, SD=.69), Death (M=.43, SD=1.74), New PVS 
(M=-.23, SD=1.40), GKW PVS (M=-1.50, SD=1.30). 
We computed independent samples t-tests comparing responses to all 
individual items for Death and for the New PVS condition. We found no 
significant difference between these conditions regarding these three items: 
Awareness (df=87, t=1.74, p=.085, New PVS M=-.36, SD=1.89 vs Death 
M=.36, SD=2.00), Emotion (df=87, t=1.58, p=.119, New PVS M=.45, 
SD=1.97 vs. Death M=1.16, SD=2.22), and Personality (df=87, t=1.235, 
p=.22, New PVS M=.55, SD=1.92 vs. Death M=1.09, SD=2.21). 
We found a significant difference between conditions regarding the 
following three items. In the case of Memory (df=87, t=4.157, p<.001, 
New PVS M=-.89, SD=1.75 vs. Death M=.78, SD=2.01) and 
Right/Wrong (df=87, t=2.68, p=.009, New PVS M=-.43, SD=1.92 vs. 
Death M=.69, SD=2.02), the means were significantly higher in the Death 
condition. But in the case of Influence, the mean was significantly higher 
in the New PVS condition (df=87, t=2.00, p=.049, New PVS M=-.70, 
SD=1.82 vs. Death M=-1.47, SD=1.78). 
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We also checked for correlations between responses to the religiosity 
questions and to responses to the Death condition. We found that the 
mind perception index was positively correlated with the first religiosity 
question (‘There is life after death’), r(43)=.357, p=.016, as well as the 
second religiosity question (‘The soul lives on after a person has died’), 
r(43)=.376, p=.011, but not with the third religiosity question (‘I am a 
religious person’), r(43)=.204, p=.179. 
Finally, in order to check whether the mean mind perception index was 
being driven by the responses of those high in religiosity, we followed the 
method used in the second study of Gray et al. (2011) and compiled a 
‘Religiosity Index’ by averaging responses to the three questions 
(Cronbach’s α=.888). We split the religiosity index into thirds and ran a 4 
(State: Life, GKW PVS, New PVS, Death) x 2 (Religiosity: high, low) 
analysis of variance (ANOVA), comparing those who answered in the top 
third of the religiosity index (those high in religiosity) with those who 
answered in the lower third of the religiosity index (those low religiosity). 
We found a main effect of state (F(3, 119) = 29.836, p>.001, partial eta 
squared .446), a main effect of religiosity (F(1, 119) = 8.667, p=.004, 
partial eta squared = .072), but no interaction, (F(3, 119) = .512, p=.675. 
We then conducted t-tests to determine the differences between responses 
to each state (Death, New PVS, Life, GWK PVS) for both high and low 
religiosity participants on the mind perception index. For high religiosity 
participants, we found significant differences between Death and GKW 
PVS (df=25, t=2.81, p=.009), and between GKW PVS and New PVS 
(df=37, t=2.03, p=.050), but no significant difference between Death and 
New PVS (df=24, t=1.35, p=.190). For low religiosity participants, we 
found significant differences between Death and GKW PVS (df=35, 
t=3.39, p=.002), and between GKW PVS and New PVS (df=18, t=2.39, 
p=.028), but no significant difference between Death and New PVS 
(df=33, t=1.21, p=.237). On the mind perception index, both high and 
low religiosity participants exhibited the same sensitivity to the states in 
question. 
c. Discussion. 
This experiment replicates the results of Gray et al. (2011). But it also 
shows that when participants are not presented with a misleading 
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description of PVS, people ascribe more mental functioning to PVS 
patients than to those who have had their “entire brain… destroyed, 
except for the one part that keeps [them] breathing”. More importantly, 
the data show a puzzling pattern of responses. 
Gray et al. found that for each item measured, participants ascribed 
significantly less mind to David in the GKW PVS condition than in the 
Death condition. We replicated this result (all ps>.04). However, the 
differences between the New PVS condition and the Death condition were 
not as clear-cut: for some items the differences were insignificant, and for 
one item (Influence) PVS mentality was significantly higher than Death. 
This differential pattern of response calls into question the conclusion that 
“PVS patients are uniformly perceived to have mental functioning less 
than that of the dead” (p.276). Thus, we conclude that the experiments 
conducted by Gray et al. (2011) license only the conclusion that those 
with destroyed brains are uniformly perceived to have less mental 
functioning than those who are dead. 
5. Fictional Timelines 
The methodology in the previous experiments relies on measuring 
participant responses to fictional vignettes. We should therefore expect 
that conventions surrounding the genre of fiction may affect participants’ 
responses. We argued in Gomes and Parrott (2014) that a complex set of 
contextually variable parameters determine what readers judge as being 
true ‘according to’ the fiction. Indeed, a number of characteristic features 
of fiction plausibly affect the way people respond to questions concerning 
a fictional text (Friend 2012). Moreover, there is some empirical evidence 
that indicates a person’s responses to a written text differ significantly 
depending on whether they believe it to be fiction or non-fiction (Prentice 
and Gerrig 1999). We suggest that one convention surrounding fiction is 
particularly relevant to subject responses in the previous experiments. 
Fictional stories often represent an extended period of time. Call this the 
fictional timeline. Within a fictional text, characters are represented as 
having different attributes at different moments of the fictional timeline. 
For instance, some questions about a character in a fictional text explicitly 
specify a precise moment in the fictional timeline which the question 
concerns. But when a question doesn’t specify a particular moment, it is 
open for respondents to understand the question in different ways. This 
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will turn out to be important in assessing the data presented in Gray et al. 
(2011). 
An example will help illustrate the phenomenon. Imagine finishing Anna 
Karenina and being asked: does Anna really care for her son? In answering 
that question, we think back to the characterisation of Anna’s relationship 
with her son; we naturally think of the things she does and whether they 
can be explained as resulting from her love for him. We can disagree about 
the answer. But it would be odd to answer ‘No’ to the question on the 
basis that Anna dies at the end of the novel, so is therefore incapable of 
loving anyone. The question doesn’t specify that we should assess whether 
Anna loves her son at the end of the fictional timeline – and, in some ways, 
it would be an odd person who understood it in that way. 
The questions presented in Gray et al. (2011) and in our first study are 
meant to ascertain whether subjects think certain things are true of David 
at a particular point in his timeline – i.e., after his accident. But, like the 
previous question about Anna, the questions don’t specify that. That leaves 
it open for subjects to interpret the question as concerning some other 
point or period of the fictional timeline or no determinate point of time at 
all. Thus, if we want to ensure that participants are interpreting questions 
in the manner intended, that is as questions concerning a specific point in 
time, we need to add a focusing clause to the questions, making explicit 
the point in the fictional timeline which the they concern. We do this in 
the following experiment. 
6. Study 2 
a. Procedures. 
This study followed the model of study one. Participants were again 
presented with one of the same four vignettes used in study one and asked 
to rate their agreement with a series of statements. Ratings were offered on 
a scale from -3 to 3, with -3 representing ‘strongly disagree,’ 3 ‘strongly 
agree,’ and 0 ‘neither agree nor disagree.’ In this study, however, each 
statement included a focusing clause, clarifying what the item was 
attempting to measure. In the Life condition, all statements began with the 
clause ‘After his recovery,’ followed by the wording used by Gray et al. 
(2011) and by our study one. In the GKW PVS and the New PVS 
conditions, all items began with the clause ‘After his accident.’ In the 
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Death condition, all items began with the clause ‘After his death.’ 
Participants then answered the same religiosity questions as did 
participants in study one.2 
Participants were 200 adults recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk. 7 participants failed a comprehension question, or failed to fill out 
the entire survey, and were excluded from analysis. Of the remaining 193 
participants, 79 were female (mean age=33.59). 
b. Results. 
We again averaged responses for each participant to form a mind 
perception index (Cronbach’s α=.969). We then conducted a 4 (State: 
Life, GKW PVS, New PVS, Death) x 2 (Sex: female, male) analysis of 
variance (ANOVA). This test revealed a main effect of state (F(3, 193) = 
154.98, p>.001), none for Sex, F (1, 193) = .619, p=.433, and a significant 
interaction, F(3, 193) = 3.702, p=.013. Fischer’s least significant difference 
test (LSD) revealed that Death, GKW PVS, and New PVS differed 
significantly from Life (all ps<.001), and that no other condition differed 
significantly, although the difference between Death and GKW PVS 
approached significance (p=.057). Mean mind perception index ratings for 
the four conditions were as follows: Life (M=2.25, SD=.68), Death (M=-
1.70, SD=1.54), New PVS (M=-1.68, SD=1.13), GKW PVS (M=-2.12, 
SD=1.07). 
We also conducted independent samples t-tests comparing individual 
responses to all individual items for the Death and New PVS conditions. 
We found no significant difference between responses to five of the items 
(for Right/Wrong, Personality, memory, and Awareness, all ps>.45), 
though there was a trend towards significance for Emotion, with p=.053. 
In that case the mean for the New PVS condition was higher than the 
mean for the Death condition (-1.21 vs. -1.87, respectively). There was a 
significant difference in the Influence condition (df=93, t=2.52, p=.013), 
with the mean higher in the Death condition (-1.55 vs. -2.35 in the New 
PVS condition). 
 
2 In there second study, Gray et. al. (2011) do add a sort of focusing clause in the ‘Corpse 
condition’ in order to highlight David’s death, which does affect the results for non-
religious participants.  However, they omit similar focusing clauses for the other 
conditions.  
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We then checked for correlations between responses to the religiosity 
questions and responses to the Death condition. We found that the mind 
perception index was positively correlated with all three questions. For the 
first religiosity question (‘There is life after death’), r(45)=.651, p<.001; for 
the second religiosity question (‘The soul lives on after a person has died’), 
r(45)=.675, p<.001; for the third religiosity question (‘I am a religious 
person’), r(45)=.327, p=.025. 
As above, we followed the method used in the second study of Gray et al. 
(2011) and compiled a ‘Religiosity Index’ by averaging responses to the 
three questions (Cronbach’s α=.922), comparing those who answered in 
the top third of the religiosity index (those high in religiosity) with those 
who answered in the lower third of the religiosity index (those low 
religiosity). We ran a 4 (State: Life, GKW PVS, New PVS, Death) x 2 
(Religiosity: high, low) analysis of variance (ANOVA). We found main 
effects for State (F(3, 138) = 150.85, p<.001, partial eta squared = .777), 
and for Religiosity (F(1, 138) = 28.86, p<.001, partial eta squared = .182), 
and a significant interaction (F3, 138) = 8.10, p<.001, partial eta squared = 
.157). For high religiosity participants, Fischer’s Least Significant 
Difference test revealed a significant difference between Death and GKW 
PVS (p=.007), but none between Death and New PVS (p=.082) and none 
between GKW PVS and New PVS (p=.348). For low religiosity 
participants, the same test revealed no significant difference between 
Death, GKW PVS, and New PVS (all ps>.346). We also computed the 
same test with only the high religiosity participants excluded. There was no 
significant difference between Death, GKW PVS, and New PVS (all 
ps>.098). 
Since the means in the Death, GKW PVS and New PVS conditions 
looked much lower in study two than in study one, we conducted post hoc 
t-tests between each condition, comparing the means for the mind 
perception index in study one with the relevant means in study two. There 
was no significant difference between responses to the Life condition 
(p=.237), but the differences in the other three conditions were significant. 
For the Death condition, df=90, t=6.24, p<.001. For the New PVS 
condition, df=90, t=5.49, p<.001. For the GKW PVS condition, df=101, 
t=2.60, p=.011. 
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c. Discussion. 
The only difference between studies one and two was the addition of a 
focusing clause in study two. This clause served to clarify the questions by 
informing participants that they were asking about David after his 
accident. That the differences between responses to items in studies one 
and two are significant indicates that there was substantial confusion about 
what was being asked of participants in the studies conducted by Gray et 
al. (2011) and in our study one. 
It is noteworthy that responses in the Death, GKW PVS and New PVS 
conditions are all substantially lower once the focusing clause is added than 
responses to the equivalent items in study one. This suggests that, on the 
whole, participants judge that mentality is absent in all three cases. 
Furthermore, the difference between each of these three conditions is not 
clearly significant and once we discount those high in religiosity – that is, 
those who explicitly think that one’s soul persists after death (roughly one 
third of our participants) – there is no significant difference between the 
three conditions. Thus, contrary to the claims of Gray et al., our study 
shows that most people do not ascribe more mentality to the dead than to 
PVS patients.3 
7. Conclusions 
Gray, Knickman and Wegner (2011) claim that people perceive patients in 
PVS to have less mental capacity than the dead. We have shown two 
things. First, that it is mistaken to say that the experiments in Gray et al 
(2011) show that people uniformly perceive PVS patients to have less 
mentality than the dead. Instead, the data may be tracking how people 
perceive those who have had almost their entire brain destroyed. And, 
second and more importantly, that the pattern of data reported is an 
artefact of the way the questions are posed and do not track people’s 
genuine views about the mental capacity involved in death and PVS. Once 
the questions have been clarified, we find no evidence to suggest that 
people actually perceive PVS patients as more dead than dead. 
 
3 In Gomes and Parrott (2014), two of us suggested that people are implicit Epicureans – 
that they think that the dead no longer exist – and that this is why they ascribe less 
mentality to PVS patients than to the dead.  Since study 2 shows that most people do not 
ascribe less mentality to PVS patients than to the dead, there is no reason to endorse the 
Epicurean hypothesis. 
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